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DRAFT

MESSAGE IN A MORTGAGE: WHAT DODD-FRANK’S ―QUALIFIED MORTGAGE‖
TELLS US ABOUT OURSELVES
David Reiss*
This essay outlines the ethics that shape federal housing finance policy
and situates them in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act.1 In a way, however, it
asks a simpler question: what do our mortgages tell us about our society?
The essay proceeds as follows. First, it outlines three ethics that inform
American housing finance policy generally. Second, it contrasts two mortgages:
the one from the subprime boom of the early 2000s and the other from DoddFrank, the ―Qualified Mortgage.‖ It concludes by using the three ethics to
answer the question posed above. It also outlines what is at stake in the
housing sector given the choices that we might make.
This inquiry takes place in the face of the immense complexity of the
American housing finance system. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Federal Housing Finance Administration (FHFA) and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), among other federal
regulators, are responsible for regulating the federal residential finance market,
a market that is now more than eleven trillion dollars ($11,000,000,000,000).2
Trying to derive a clear understanding of federal housing finance policy in the
face of the extraordinary regulatory complexity is no mean task.3 And given the
size of this market, the stakes are, of course, high.
*

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Versions of this essay were presented at the Shadow
Banking symposium at the Boston University School of Law on February 24, 2012 and the Ongoing
Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act: Consumer Protection and Other Goals symposium at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School on November 18, 2011.. The author would like to thank
participants of the symposiums for their comments. Steven Hasty provided excellent research
assistance.
1
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 [hereinafter the ―Dodd-Frank Act‖ or ―Dodd-Frank‖].
2

Market Data, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70 (last visited
Feb. 21, 2012).
3
This discussion of housing policy ethics is drawn from David Reiss, First Principles for An
Effective Federal Housing Policy, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 795 (2010).
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I.

HOUSING POLICY ETHICS

Let me begin with my outline of three broad ethics that inform housing
finance policy: the ―Housing as an Economic Good‖ ethic; the ―Housing as a
Human Right‖ ethic; and the ―Housing as a Bulwark of Democracy‖ ethic.
The ―Housing as an Economic Good‖ ethic treats housing as any other
commodity and asks how government policies will distort the functioning of
the market for housing. The ―Housing as an Economic Good‖ ethic is woven
throughout all debates regarding federal housing policy, as many of the
programs of the past have come to be criticized for their unintended distortions
of the housing market.4 Employing this ethic, policymakers can identify
policies which reduce the supply, affordability and quality of housing in the
long-term even if they reduce the cost of housing in the short term.
The second ethic that is imbued throughout discussions of federal
housing finance policy is the ―Housing as a Human Right‖ ethic. This ethic
asks how a policy furthers the goal of making safe, well-maintained and
affordable housing available to all. While housing as a human right has only
been stated aspirationally in federal law, it does echo in the many ways that
housing affordability and quality have become central to housing policy
generally and housing finance policy specifically. A variety of federal
programs reflect this ethic, such as the various mortgage guaranty programs for
first-time homeowners and affordable housing projects as well as programs that
provide capital advances for projects that serve special needs populations such
as the elderly and the disabled.
The third relevant ethic is ―Housing as a Bulwark of Democracy.‖ The
importance of this ethic in American politics and American housing finance
policy cannot be overstated. The centrality of homeownership to America’s
vision of itself as a society of equal citizens reaches at least as far back as
Jefferson’s idealized ―yeoman farmer.‖ Jefferson’s yeoman farmer was his
ideal citizen because he was self-sufficient, earning his own keep and
considered himself the equal of anyone else, jealously guarding his liberty and
his unalienable rights.
Lincoln’s Homestead Act of 1862, which granted 160 acres to settlers,
continued the idea of the ―yeoman farmer‖ and the ―yeoman farmer‖ then
morphed into the ―homeowner‖ in the 20th Century with presidents as different
4

Rent control is the most commonly discussed example of a policy with a negative unintended
distortion of the housing market, with economists nearly universal in their judgment that rent control
ultimately reduces the supply of rental housing, particularly for low-income families, thereby
increasing the aggregate cost of such housing.
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as Herbert Hoover, Lyndon Johnson, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush making
homeownership a key aspect of their political agendas.
As the various instrumentalities of the federal government adopt new
housing policies implemented through complex and opaque regulations, we
must evaluate whether they are consistent with the housing policy ethics that
we have identified. Because the muddier the waters, the more that special
interests can divert resources to their own ends. Clarity of thought helps to
promote the efficient and equitable use of government resources.

II.

A TALE OF TWO MORTGAGES

With this framework for thinking about federal housing policy in mind,
let me tell my tale of two mortgages. One of my most striking memories from
the height of the Subprime Boom of the mid-Aughts involves a phone call from
a reporter for the Wall Street Journal.5 He wanted me to comment on a
particular type of high interest mortgage marketed by a national lender. The
mortgage came with a two-year teaser cap on loan payments (not on the interest
rate mind you—on the payments!). It also had a three-year prepayment penalty
period. This can create a perfect storm for a borrower, particularly for an
unsophisticated one.
We can call this perfect storm ―payment shock,‖ a situation where a
borrower is hit with a dramatic rise in her mortgage monthly payment after an
earlier period of lower monthly payments. For once the artificially low
payments of the two-year teaser period end, the borrower might find it difficult
to make her payments on the loan.
This is because the loan may have negatively amortized over the first
two years—that is, the amount owed has actually increased. This can occur
because the payment cap may keep the borrower’s monthly payments lower
than the amount of interest that had accrued that month. The interest that is not
paid is then added to the principal amount of the loan, and later interest is
calculated on this higher amount. And because the loan is now amortizing over
a 28-year period (after the two year teaser period has ended), instead of the
more typical 30 years that mortgages take to amortize, the principal payments
are even higher. This payment increase is further compounded because the full
amount of interest is now due in the month that it accrues as opposed to being
deferred by the payment cap.
5

I had briefly discussed this mortgage product in David Reiss, How the Residential MortgageBacked Securities Market Impacts Dirt Lawyers and Their Clients, N.Y. REAL PROP. L.J., Fall 2007, at
35.
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That is not all. Remember that the mortgage has a prepayment penalty.
If the borrower tries to refinance from this high interest rate product to a more
affordable one after the two-year teaser cap is lifted, she will be forced to pay a
prepayment penalty. That is because the prepayment penalty period lasts for
three years, a year longer than the teaser cap on payments.
This ensures that the lender wins—one way or another. Borrower either
(i) pays the significantly higher amount due after year two or (ii) she is forced
to prepay to get a more affordable payment schedule; pay the prepayment
penalty to Lender; and refinance into another loan. If the lender were lucky, she
would refinance with it again, generating a new set of origination fees.
So what are the values that are implicit in such a mortgage? At our
most charitable, we can argue that it reflects the ―Housing as an Economic
Good‖ ethic described above. The homeowner who accepted these terms was
not coerced. She was free to hire a lawyer to review the terms of the mortgage
if she so desired. Perhaps, even, this was the best—or only—mortgage that she
was eligible for. So at our most charitable, we could say that this mortgage tells
of a society committed to freedom of contract and one that expects its members
to take responsibility for their decisions, with no net in case they fail. Such a
mortgage would reflect the ―Housing as an Economic Good‖ and would treat
the homeowner as a rational economic actor.
A slightly less charitable view would say that this mortgage reflects a
caveat emptor approach to property law—the state disavows any responsibility
to protect consumers through common or statutory law. But it at least puts
parties on notice: LET THE BUYER BEWARE—you are on your own. And an
even less charitable view would describe this mortgage as predatory—a
symptom of a society with an even simpler message to its inhabitants:
BEWARE—this state signals that we exist close to a state of war of every man
against every man and where life in the housing market can often be ―solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.‖6
In other words, the message of such a mortgage is that we are in a
constant state of competition and if some large entities are able to secure a big
advantage, individuals in the market should just beware. In any case, this
mortgage in no way reflects the other ethics of federal housing policy:
―Housing as a Human Right‖ or ―Housing as a Bulwark of Democracy.‖ And
some people like it that way—including numerous academics committed to a
classic laissez-faire approach to consumer markets; many in the consumer
finance industry; and many politicians who oppose greater consumer protection
regulation.

6

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 57 (1651) (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 2011).
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Now let’s turn to another species of mortgage, Dodd Frank’s ―Qualified
Mortgage‖ as well as its statutory sibling, the ―Qualified Residential
Mortgage.‖ The ―Qualified Mortgage‖ is one that is privileged by Dodd-Frank
in order to incentivize lenders to originate them instead of other types of
mortgages.7 The ―Qualified Mortgage‖ provides lenders with a safe harbor from
certain provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as well as from DoddFrank’s mandatory ―ability to repay‖ underwriting standards.8
Dodd-Frank leaves the term ―Qualified Residential Mortgage‖ to be
defined by federal regulators, but it must be no broader than a ―Qualified
Mortgage.‖9 The ―Qualified Residential Mortgage‖ is exempted from the credit
7

Dodd-Frank § 1412 (adding section 129C(b)(2) to the Truth in Lending Act, to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)). Dodd-Frank requires that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
promulgate rules relating to ―Qualified Mortgages.‖ Id.
8
Dodd-Frank § 1412. The ―safe harbor‖ is a rebuttable presumption that a ―Qualified Mortgage‖
meets Dodd-Frank section 1411’s ―ability to repay‖ standards. Id. FHA and GSE-insured loans are
exempt from the ―skin in the game requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(G)(ii). See also Andrea J.
Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and Control of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1558 (2011) (explaining why GSEs should also be subject to
the ―skin in the game‖ requirement).
9
15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(C) (2011). The OCC, FRB, FDIC, SEC, FHFA and HUD issued an
Interagency Proposed Rule on Credit Risk Retention that proposed a definition of the ―Qualified
Residential Mortgage.‖ 76 F.R. 24090 (Apr. 29, 2011); see 76 F.R. 34010 (June 10, 2011) (modifying
proposed rulemaking schedule).
The guidelines for such a definition are found at 15 U.S.C. section 78o-11(e)(4)(B):
The Federal banking agencies, the Commission, the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, and the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency shall jointly define the
term "qualified residential mortgage" for purposes of this subsection, taking into consideration
underwriting and product features that historical loan performance data indicate result in a
lower risk of default, such as-(i) documentation and verification of the financial resources relied upon to qualify
the mortgagor;
(ii) standards with respect to-(I) the residual income of the mortgagor after all monthly obligations;
(II) the ratio of the housing payments of the mortgagor to the monthly income of
the mortgagor;
(III) the ratio of total monthly installment payments of the mortgagor to the
income of the mortgagor;
(iii) mitigating the potential for payment shock on adjustable rate mortgages through
product features and underwriting standards;
(iv) mortgage guarantee insurance or other types of insurance or credit enhancement
obtained at the time of origination, to the extent such insurance or credit enhancement reduces
the risk of default; and
(v) prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon payments, negative amortization,
prepayment penalties, interest-only payments, and other features that have been demonstrated
to exhibit a higher risk of borrower default.
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risk retention (―skin in the game‖) provisions that apply to securitizers and
originators of asset-backed securities.10
The net effect of this component of Dodd-Frank is to create a kind of
―plain vanilla‖ mortgage option that lenders will want to originate because it
poses fewer regulatory and litigation risks.11 This plain vanilla option is meant
to crowd out a number of abusive practices that sprang up during the Subprime
Boom. While not labeled explicitly, each of these prongs is tied to a notorious
lending practice.
In general, the term ―Qualified Mortgage‖ covers any residential
mortgage:
1. for which the periodic payments do not result in an increase in
principal and which does not allow the borrower to defer
principal payments; read this as no negatively amortizing (also
known as ―payment choice‖) mortgages.
2. for which income and the other financial resources of the
borrower are verified and documented; read this as no liar
loans.12
3. that does not include balloon payments; read this as no
payment shock.
4. with underwriting based on a fully amortizing payment
schedule for fixed rate mortgages and, for adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs), with underwriting based on the maximum
rate permitted under the loan for its first five years with a
payment schedule that fully amortizes it over its full term; read
this as, again, no payment shock.
5. which comply with applicable regulatory guidelines or
regulations relating to acceptable debt to income ratios; read this
as no equity-based lending.

10

Dodd-Frank § 941. Generally, securitizers must retain at least five percent of the credit risk for
any asset to be securitized that is not a ―Qualified Residential Mortgage,‖ the so-called ―skin in the
game.‖ 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c) (2011).
11

See John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175, 175–76 (2011). The definitions of
―Qualified Mortgage‖ and ―Qualified Residential Mortgage‖ bring back to life the ―plain vanilla‖
mortgage option that had been heatedly debated before Dodd-Frank was adopted but had been rejected
in its original incarnation. Id.
12
Joe Nocera, In Prison for Taking a Liar Loan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/business/26nocera.html (describing consumer convicted for fraud
on applications for stated-income loans, the formal term for ―liar loans.‖).
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6. for which points and fees are no more than three percent; read
this as, no equity stripping; and
7. for which the loan term does not exceed 30 years, except in
certain high-cost areas; read this as no endless cycles of debt.13
What does this mortgage say about the society from which it sprang?
Let’s get the bad stuff out of the way: it says that paternalism is appropriate in
some contexts. It limits the flexibility of parties to modify a mortgage when
compared to how society regulates goods and services generally. It may restrict
credit needlessly. And it may be irrelevant. In sum, it may diverge from the
―Housing as an Economic Good‖ ethic to some large extent.
Paternalistic
It had long been the view among economists that consumer protection
is paternalistic to the extent that consumers are rational.14 Behavioral
economics has challenged this notion, demonstrating that consumers can
behave in predictably irrational ways (and indeed, in some cases, in rationally
ignorant ways).15 This debate plays out, of course, in discussions of DoddFrank, too.16
The Subprime Bust has made paternalism much easier to swallow as a
policy choice because so many have made such spectacularly bad choices. And
behavioral economics has provided a theoretical justification for paternalistic
government policies that some had found lacking until recently.
Limits Flexibility

13
Dodd-Frank § 1412. ―Qualified Mortgages‖ also have a limitation on prepayment penalties.
Dodd Frank § 1414 (adding section 129C(c)(3) to TILA, to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)(4)).
Qualified Mortgage prepayment penalties must be no greater than three percent and must phase out
over a three year period. Id. This provision also reduces the opportunities for equity stripping.
For a discussion of the characteristics of predatory residential mortgages, see David Reiss,
Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending To Flourish in The
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 992–97 (2006).
14

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15–17 (3d ed. 1986). Public
choice theorists might characterize consumer protection regulation in even worse terms: it is the
product of rent-seekers who hope to gain favorable regulations to benefit themselves and who may
couch the regulations in consumer protection garb in order to make it more palatable politically. See
generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (setting forth theory of public choice).
15
See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39 (1980).
16
See, e.g., Pottow, supra note 10, at 206 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s paternalism); Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Investment Regulations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1278 (2011)
(discussing paternalistic aspects of financial reform).
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It is well established that rules-based regulation is less flexible than a
standards-based approach or an unfettered market for that matter. The definition
of a ―Qualified Mortgage‖ surely falls within the scope of rules-based
regulation, with its bars on numerous mortgage characteristics.17
The Dodd-Frank Act did, however, build significant regulatory
flexibility into its regulation of mortgages. Dodd-Frank authorizes regulators to
prescribe regulations that revise, add to, or subtract from the
criteria that define a qualified mortgage upon a finding that such
regulations are necessary or proper to ensure that responsible,
affordable mortgage credit remains available to consumers in a
manner consistent with the purposes of [the relevant sections of
Dodd-Frank], to prevent circumvention or evasion therefore, or
to facilitate compliance with such sections.18
It remains to be seen whether regulators will be nimble enough to deploy such
flexibility, but the option is certainly there.
Restricts Credit
Consumer advocates and real estate industry trade groups argue that
strict underwriting criteria contained in the proposed ―Qualified Residential
Mortgage‖ definition will restrict credit to many who could benefit from it.
The Coalition for Sensible Housing Policy (a coalition of 44 groups
including the Center for Responsible Lending, the consumer advocacy
organization, as well as the American Bankers Association) stated in its
comments on the Interagency Proposed Rule on Credit Risk Retention that it
was
particularly concerned about the consequences of establishing a
high down payment requirement of 10% or 20% (or more for
refinances) as well as unnecessarily restrictive debt-to-income
and rigid credit history requirements. Without significant
changes to the narrow [―Qualified Residential Mortgage‖]
definition, we believe the rule would raise the cost of mortgages
and reduce access for creditworthy borrowers . . . .19

17

Dodd-Frank § 1412 (defining ―Qualifying Mortgage‖). See supra text accompanying note 12.

18

Dodd-Frank § 1412(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e) (allowing
Federal banking agencies and SEC to adopt exemptions, exceptions and adjustments to ―skin in the
game‖ requirements).
19
COAL. FOR SENSIBLE HOUS. POLICY, PROPOSED QRM DEFINITION HARMS CREDITWORTHY
BORROWERS WHILE FRUSTRATING HOUSING RECOVERY 1 (2011), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/Coalition-QRMWhite-Paper-1.pdf. The Coalition argues that ―once you apply the strong underwriting standards in the
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Finding the right balance between responsible underwriting and access
to credit is, of course, key. But again, Dodd-Frank allows for such a result
because of the flexibility built into the statute to change the definition of a
―Qualified Mortgage‖ and a ―Qualified Residential Mortgage.‖
Possibly Irrelevant
Adam Levitin, Andrey Pavlov and Susan Wachter argue that the
―Qualified Mortgage‖ and ―Qualified Residential Mortgage‖ definitions may be
too narrow such that they could not sufficiently crowd out less-consumer
friendly mortgage products from the market.20 In other words, unless such
mortgages get a critical mass of market share, they may not impede a new cycle
of abusive lending practices once the credit markets recover from their current
swoon. They also note that the definitions could turn out to be too broad such
that they allow in many risky mortgage products within their scope.21 In other
words, if regulators allow too many risky options in the name of increased
consumer choice, the ―Qualified Mortgage‖ and the ―Qualified Residential
Mortgage‖ designations may not provide much consumer protection at all. Both
paths could lead to a return to a mortgage market where abusive lending
practices return with a vengeance.
And, of course, particular financial services companies may push for
radically different definitions in order to increase their own market share. For
instance, lenders who specialize in reasonably large down payment loans
(prime lenders) might be only too happy to have a high down payment
requirement in order to drive competitors (subprime lenders) and their products
from the market. Other market participants, like subprime lenders, might
perversely favor very stringent requirements (very, very high down payment
requirements) for ―Qualified Residential Mortgages‖ so that few mortgages
(even many of those originated by prime lenders) could qualify as ―Qualified
Residential Mortgages.‖ Subprime lenders might find that this would level the
playing field between prime and subprime lenders because neither would be
able to get the cheaper financing through securitization that the ―Qualified
Residential Mortgage‖ would be able to achieve. Or, the ultimate compromise
sample QRM definition, moving from a 5 percent to a 10 percent down payment requirement reduces
the overall default experience by an average of only two- to three-tenths of one percent for each cohort
year. However, the increase in the minimum down payment from 5 percent to 10 percent would
eliminate from 4 to 7 percent of borrowers from qualifying for a lower rate QRM loan.‖ Id. at 6.
20
Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk
Capital to the Securitization Market?, __ YALE J. ON REG. __, at 11 (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970288.
21
Id. A related question is whether regulators can keep up with market participants as they attempt
to circumvent the spirit of the regulations while complying with their letter. See Richard Hynes & Eric
Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 162 (2002).
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on the definitions could be just so lousy that they could lead to a dormant
mortgage market, with a concomitant catatonic housing market. Thus, a key
question is whether the definitions of these two terms achieve a sweet spot
among the approaches.22
*

*

*

So, what is good about the ―Qualified Mortgage?‖ As opposed to the
Subprime Boom mortgage product discussed above, the ―Qualified Mortgage‖
definition reflects the other two ethics that inform federal housing finance
policy. Housing affordability, an aspect of ―Housing as a Human Right,‖ is
present in its terms that
(i)

reduce payment shock over the life of the mortgage;

(ii)

bar liar loans (which typically overstate income and
thus lead to higher payments than borrowers can
afford); and

(iii)

bar equity-based underwriting (that is, the lender now
must determine that the homeowner has the means to
be able to pay the loan back so that the loan will not
result in foreclosure).

―Housing as a Bulwark of Democracy‖ is present in its terms that tend to make
homeowners more and more financially self-sufficient:

III.

(i)

no negative amortization;

(ii)

no equity stripping; and

(iii)

no endless cycle of debt.

OUR MORTGAGES, OURSELVES

I have posited that each of these mortgages, the worst from the
Subprime Boom and Dodd-Frank’s response, is a microcosm of a different
vision of society. But while inconsistent with each other, these two mortgages
both fall squarely within the traditions of American housing finance policy. So,
clarity is important here because we have a choice between two starkly
different visions of federal housing finance policy: the first, based on caveat
emptor or the second, based on a vision of housing as a foundation for a stable
life for homeowners and their families.

22

See Levitin et al., supra note 20, at 23.
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That second vision need not compromise efficiency goals. Rather it
can provide a structure to the market that allows for healthy price competition
among financial institutions. It can also provide a structure that offers
consumer protection to rein in abusive practices that take advantage of
homeowners negotiating for the most complex product that they are ever likely
to obtain.
I would have found it ridiculous that the need for consumer protection
in the mortgage markets would need to be so vigorously defended after the
Subprime Bust. But throughout the academy, the financial industry and the
political arena, it is clear that many are ideologically or self-interestedly
opposed to consumer protection. As to those who are ideologically opposed,
there will not be a meeting of the minds, as far as I can tell, if the events of the
last ten years have not changed their minds. For those who have a financial
interest in the outcome of this fight, we should expect them to be driven by that
self-interest. Indeed, I am reminded of the words that Adam Smith—known to
some as a proponent of free markets—used to close Book One of The Wealth of
Nations:
The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which
comes from [market participants], ought always to be listened to
with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after
having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most
scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from
an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with
that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and
even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon
many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.23
It is left to those of us operating in the political arena, citizens and
politicians alike, to allow ourselves to be taught by experience as we adopt a
new structure for the residential mortgage market. The lessons that I have
learned include the fact that unregulated mortgage markets have a cycle of their
own that leads from Boom to Bust. I have also learned that unregulated
mortgage markets allow sophisticated, repeat market participants like lenders to
take advantage of unsophisticated, one-off consumers. Experience has also
taught me that disclosure is insufficient to overcome the complexity of many
credit transactions for many consumers. Finally, experience has taught me that
people systematically make bad predictions about their own future preferences,
particularly as far as credit transactions are concerned.
23
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 287–
88 (1776) (E. Cannan ed., 1994).
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Until I learn otherwise, I see that the ―Qualified Mortgage‖ and its
sibling the ―Qualified Residential Mortgage‖ better reflect the values inherent
in federal housing policy than the unfettered products that sprang up during the
Subprime Boom. If employed properly, the structure for the residential
mortgage markets implicit within Dodd-Frank’s text may improve the stability
of that market while also allowing for widespread access to credit. But it will be
for those making the decisions in the political arena to determine whether that
is how we, as a nation, see ourselves.
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